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This paper examines the impact of regulation on market competition and market performances. It analyses the 
importance of strict financial regulation for a well performing economy. Heavy regulation decreases market 
flexibility, vital in the financial sector and decreases the possibility of competition. In a rigid legal environment 
economic actors will be drawn to the possibility of avoiding legal rules, and operate in a informal manner. At 
the same time regulation is necessary to enable financial stability, market integrity and confidence. This aspects 
are very important in transition countries which are on the way to implement and accept the modern market 
mechanism which are replacing state economy. 
 
The paper discusses the legal tendencies in regulating the financial sector in EU, the benchmark for Croatian 
legislation. In order to understand the scope and to be able to advocate this legislation and institutions a sight 
on its roots and development in US is also laid down. In spite of the outmost goal of transparency the European 
legislation is rather complicated and reveals more the interests of biggest stakeholders and professional rent 
seeking groups than genuine public and small investor’s expectation. In assessing concrete legal solutions, 
European directives are so far the only international model of financial supervision in a predominantly national 
regulatory environment.  
 
The question about its positive effects inducing economic growth at the top although intricate on such level of 
abstraction is not yet too confirmed. It is not about bundle of legislation but its nature and pace of 
implementation that will gradually induce confidence and investment. In order to achieve that open and right 
questions are to be publicly advocated rather than premature and anticipating statements. 
 
The question posed is if regulation is a core factor in good financial and overall economic performance in 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The rapid pace of globalization and the internationalization of business has been a controversial issue for the 
past decade and thus intensively discussed within the academic and expert community. With the intensification 
of business transactions and growth of international business the emphasis is on the qualitative dimensions of 
these phenomena. The great challenge of the contemporary globalization is in ensuring economic liberalization 
and increase transnational investment together with the structuring of practices and institutions that will secure 
“social, environmental and human rights dimensions of business performance”(Utting, 2005). The social 
implications of the free-market policies on industrial countries have been analyzed and studied in numerous 
research papers (Beck, T.. Demirgüc-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 2002), stressing the diverse effects that this trend 
has on economic growth and changes in the legal framework. Meanwhile little has been said about the reality 
of business internationalization in developing and transitional countries such as Croatia. Transition economies 
are undergoing significant structural changes in the economy, supported by matching legal reforms in order to 
achieve maximal convergence. The aim is to develop an efficient infrastructure of rules, practices and adequate 
institutions that will facilitate market activity and promote business competition as well as secure social control 
over markets. This paper analyses the contemporary aspects of global business and its conduct in developing 
countries, the potential of institutional reform process to shape a modern business environment, taking account 
of the features marking a transition economy. It emphasizes the priority of business regulation development 
and reform along with the structuring of contemporary growth policies. This paper argues that the regulatory 
approaches implemented in different countries originate from their legal background and specific economic 
evolution thus making it difficult for transition countries to implement "foreign regulations" but rather stressing 
the importance of "made-to-measure" regulatory approaches in accordance with the trends of economic 
liberalization and corporate-led globalization.  
 
 
2. CONTROL OF BUSINESS 
 
To give a clear definition of what is meant by control of business is a demanding task. The concept of control is 
very elusive – it has different meanings within different social communities, which varies with time and the 
community’s level of cohesion, its organizational stage and cultural origin. If we manage to define control, we 
are still left with another deceptive concept – that of business. Nowadays everybody seems to know what 
business is, but when the question of business control and regulation arises it is challenging to structure a 
control scheme that will comprise and be adequate to all its various types and forms. And as if the task was not 
demanding enough, the control of business is closely related with the legal origins of a social community, so 
that there is no uniform resolution to the definition of business control. In this paper we discuss the various 
concepts of control in different social and economic circumstances, giving insight to the legal origin of control 
and the areas in which control is exercised. We analyze the effects that different levels and types of control 
have on the business environment. 
 
 
 Origins of Control  
 
If we discuss the concept of control we have to understand what “control” means – in that regard we can define 
control as a form of coercion backed by an organized structure that can enforce control by power(Clark, 1939). 
Nowadays this “organized structure of power” is represented by the state and newly established regulatory 
bodies... In that sense we can argue that control became more expert than power and social orientated. This 
“social control” is exercised in behalf of the society and its groups; therefore it should include all of the 
different interests that we encounter within this socio-economic cohesion. However the level of social cohesion 
is variable – it changes together with the evolution of the demographic and economic factors, and it alters 
social interests hindering the efficiency of social control. In an era of business internationalization and booming 
trans-national business transactions, the interests that should be protected and controlled are growingly 
divergent. What is important to asses at this point, is where did control come from – what are its origins? And 
how did it evolve to this current concept of social control that is always imperfectly comprehensive or 
imperfectly social, giving the complex socio-economic cohesion of the modern business. More importantly – 
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what were the major reasons behind its evolution, and redefining? The origins of control are different if we 
analyze the American business environment or the European one. Every research in the origins of control 
should include a specific period of American economic history – the Great Depression and the New Deal 
arrangement. That period transformed the character of business, the concept of economic life and economic 
relations of every market actor, redefining the powers and responsibilities of the community toward business 
(Clark, 1939). This revolution of business perception did not affect only the American business environment – 
its arrangements and consequences spread throughout the European continent transforming the European 
industry of the time. After a period of economic prosperity mostly due to the rapidly growing oil and electric 
power industry which revolutionized the way in which business was led, the United States were left with an 
inflated bubble. Like every other economic anomalism, this bubble burst in October 1929 (the infamous Black 
Tuesday), crashing the Wall Street stock market and, together with other structural factors and followed by a 
widespread run on banks, initialized the period of Great Depression that will give incentive to a worldwide 
trend of economic instability. The American political and economic establishment reacted promptly, adjusting 
nation’s values, inserting social control within the structure of industry. A restructuring of the economy and 
democratization of business was stimulated by the New Deal arrangement (1933-1937) – including programs 
that sought reform of the financial system, institution re-structuring, and just competition in all industries. The 
financial system was re-regulated with new legislation – the most important being the Securities Act 19331, 
followed by the Securities Exchange Act the next year2. Together with the Glass-Steagal Act the Federal 
Insurance of bank deposits these regulations provided a clear framework within financial action could take 
place whilst maintaining a stable macroeconomic position of the nation. Institutions were depicted as parts of 
social machinery, evolving according to their inherent laws. However their importance in socio-economic 
management is immense, their results have to justify their existence and because of that they need to be 
directed towards socially shared interests. The growth of democracy called for a change in the character of 
business and its conduct in all sectors. It promoted the stance that not everything is fair in business and that 
business has to be subjected to rules with orderly intents. Control was denoted as an integral part of business, 
inherent to the “business game”. The New Deal arrangements clearly stated that the essential meaning of 
business is private gain subject to a variety of restrictions. 
 
The discussed aspects of the New Deal affected the system of control in other countries – Britain for example, 
which wasn’t able to adopt such a major program of reform which led to some important political changes. 
However, it promoted the importance of control of business environment and its evolution together with the 
understanding of the intelligent legislative system which starts with a fair understanding of the character and 
tendencies of business.  
 
 
 Types and areas of control 
 
To understand how the intricate network of control models the economic life it is necessary to understand 
various types of enforced control and areas of the economic system in which control is being exercised. It 
makes great difference if control is being exercised in a business area that’s a monopoly or not, whether it is 
completely consolidated or made up by a number of independent companies, or if the regulation is permanent 
or temporary – which makes impossible the choosing of a certain type of control on a general principle. We can 







                                                                          
1 The core basis of the new approach to the regulation of economic activity was: The Securities Act of 1933, The Securities 
Exchange Act 1934, The Glass-Steagal Act of 1933, and The Banking Act of 1933. 
2 The key provision of these Acts is still in force as of 2007, proving the legislative quality of these financial regulations. 
3 Coskun, C. A.: Regulation and Control vs. Deregulation and Decontrol; www.canaktan.org/canaktan_personal/canaktan-
arastirmalari/ozellestirme/aktan-regulation-control-vs.pdf ; accessed 11 March 2007 
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▪ health control 
▪ price control 
▪ wage control 
▪ rent control 
▪ interest rate control 
▪ exchange rate 
control 
 
The type of control and its form adapts to the complexity of the socio-economic conditions of a country and the 
character of business transactions that are being controlled, and therefore the overall economic performance of 
a country indirectly depends on the type of control that is implemented in a certain business are. 
 
 
 Effects and expectations 
 
Subsequent to the discussion above it is obvious that state intervention to the market can promote the stability 
of business transactions and sustain competitiveness. After the prevailing “laissez-faire” attitude of the state 
towards business in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, great economic challenges forced the state to 
structure regulations that would control the markets and thus facilitate growth.  
 
The liberalization of markets and internationalization of business in the 20th and 21st century removes artificial 
bureaucratic rigidities between countries, which sometimes greatly impair the efficiency of international trade. 
Awareness that regulation does have its limitations, and that it is not possible to form such a regulatory 
framework that will respond to different crisis situations with equal efficiency has supported the need for 
targeted regulation based on fair principles – basically it promoted deregulation. Empirical studies show that 
deregulation can promote competition and greater efficiency and effectiveness in different business areas. 
Furthermore, it is a method of achieving free market competition in countries that are facing economic and 
political transition.  
 
The growing trend in business control and market regulation is the broader view of regulation – the writing up 
of rules that are sufficient and coherent, and that respond to specific market crises and concerns. Accordingly it 
is appropriate to argue that there is a tendency to re-regulation of the market and business, the waving of 
excessive regulation and the generating of clear, targeted rules that will play an important role in supporting 
development in different business areas. 
 
 
3. TRANSITION AND REGULATION 
 
The structure of a legal system and its relevance to the conditions of the real economy are intensively discussed 
and researched by the academic society. There is empirical evidence showing that the rule of law does 
contribute to a nation’s wealth and its pace of economic growth (Scully, 1998). A modernizing state economy 
requires an adequate and harmonized legal infrastructure centered on the protection of property and contract 
rights, and formulated as a system of relatively precise legal rules. Almost every transition economy is 
characterized by a weak legal system which undercut efforts to promote a modern, market-oriented economy. 
Economic reform and transition implies legal reform - since most economic policies are implemented through 
law and regulations, and therefore one of the greatest challenges of the transition process is to prepare a set of 
written laws that will delineate individuals’ rights and responsibilities and act as a promoter of market activity. 
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In this chapter we argue that after years of detachment of the legal system from the individual market actors, 
transition is the period in which law has to connect with the economic signals, and that legal reform should be 
pursued simultaneously with economic reform (Gray, 1997). 
 
 
 Role of the state in a market economy 
 
The transition process has both a political and economic aspect, thus requiring a full-circled state reform by 
building of new institutions that empower governments to do what they should do in a market economy while 
impeding them from doing what they should not do. Since the state has played a much controversial role in the 
centrally-planned economy system that was inherent to most of developing countries, which hindered the 
efficient allocation of resources positioning the state towards goals that were centrally highlighted as social. 
However in a mature market economy the state plays an active role in remedying market irrationalities and 
organizing efficient markets. In accepting the neoclassical assumption of the spontaneity of markets the 
developing countries found new challenges inherent to the market organization that cannot be settled through 
voluntary transactions. 
 
Much debate has been made between the role of the state in transition and development, mainly based on two 
contrasting perceptions: the first calling for a large scale state intervention to solve market failures, and the 
second promoting the “naturalness” of markets whose dynamic forces inherently lead to growth. We argue that 
regardless of the “negative” legacy of the state intervention in the economy, we cannot deny that many aspects 
of the market theory and failures of welfare economics are a rationale for government activity4. Considering 
these facts, it can be stated that the role of the state in a well functioning market economy from an economic 
point of view is mainly to: 
1. bear the responsibility of maintaining macroeconomic stability; 
2. internalize the externalities between private and social costs and benefits; 
3. lessen the unemployment as a direct result of market imperfection; 
4. offset externalities in the area of information by forming regulations to protect market actor’s 
interests.  
 
A weak state during transition can be very intrusive due to the lack of effective legal and regulatory institutions. 
Market economy is embedded in state institutions which promote the moral and ideological basis of a market 
economy. But state has been as a policy matter reduced in its operation at the beginning of transition because 
that was the political impetus of dismantling socialist state and its overwhelming property. 
 
By structuring regulatory institutions and modern market institutions the transition state has been overloaded 
by tasks and costs of which its administration and public had poor knowledge and no understanding. New 
transition state had limited influences all the market participants to accept and obey market values and rules. A 
targeted state intervention in the process of the gradual establishment of a market economy is indispensable for 
facilitating market transition. The market is not a neutral and apolitical entity – it is not a means to itself. These 
are the general statements which can apply to all countries that have made choices for market economy. Then, 
it has to change its policy instruments through the re-definition of the economic policy and the structuring of an 
adequate regulatory policy. Empirical evidence show that economic growth is better achieved when the state 
and the market play as a “tandem” and when the development is promoted by a mutually supportive structure 
of market and non-market institutions. 
 
The new considerations on the course and effects of transition go beyond such generalities. Taking into 
consideration the recent decade experience in Germany it is considered that there is a general skepticism 
toward free market economy which partly generates from unsuccessful privatization projects and deceptive 
transition promises (Siebert, 2005). The German authors remind us on the roots of German liberalism and high 
                                                                          
4 „There is evidence that under conditions of administrative weakness it is harder to create and regulate functional national markets 
in goods, labor, and finance than it is for government to manage the bulk of production itself.“ Chaudhry, K. A.: The Myths of the 
Market and the Common History of Late Developers; Politics and Society, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1993 
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principles of the state intervention which is limited to guaranty of safety and equality of opportunities. 
Responsibility for welfare was delegated to society (Baum, 2005). 
 
 
4. LAW AND CONTROL IN GLOBAL BUSINESS 
 
In the globalization era the market legislation and control are questioned and revised again. . Its different forms 
and varieties existing in countries around the globe including economies that did not for economic or political 
reasons decided to implement concept of market. Every country has to determine which level of market liberty 
will be adequate to promote sustainable growth. If a country is acceding to membership of WTO or EU the 
choice is not fully within its power. Membership in respective common market associations imposes 
implementation of market law and institutions although in different degrees. What is common to all the 
“market systems” is that they are inevitably connected with law and regulatory institutions. As every economic 
system are governed by certain rules of game, the market economy is governed by the “rule of law” which 
exercises two functions in an economy – first, it regulates discretionary interventions of the state in the market 
activities, and second, it regulates the economic behavior of individuals and enterprises, providing a stable and 
predictable financial and market environment with fair competition. In order to structure a market-friendly 
legal system in transition countries we argue that there has to be a set of adequate laws, effective institutions 
that enforce them and corresponding advocacy to promote the market values and discipline. It has to bear in 
mind the realistic approach to the issue. The market discipline hurts some of social agents and sometimes very 
strong stakeholders. The compliance with market regulations induces cost sometimes so high that it makes 
entrepreneurs give up planed friendly takeovers and block the hostile one (Baum, 2005).  
 
 
 New control for new business 
 
The global business law has been mainly modeled by free trade, free circulation o goods, capital. And other 
within GATT, WTO and EU. On the financial and take over market the controlling norms and institutions were 
not caching up the pace of dynamic practice. Namely the harmonization of financial markets has not been 
traditional agenda of trade harmonization. As a result we have now apart from US stock market domestic 
regulation as a most developed one only European law “international” i.e. global business market regulation 
and regulators supposed to serve financial stability and market credibility. Japanese, Singapore, Hong Kong 
and other important financial market stay within their national borders. 
 
 
 Prudential and market regulation 
 
Three main pillars of financial regulations in Europe are: banking, insurance (including pension funds) and 
security regulations. Regulation is considered mainly rule making different from supervision which regards the 
implementation of rules in specific cases (Wymeersch, 2005). Regulation is rule making which regulates also 
supervision. In Europe this activities are separated while in USA they are comprised under one notion. 
Regulators issue rules, they are also “rule makers” and supervisors under same roof. 
 
Regarding sector specific criteria under the “prudential” regulation is understood regulation of banks, 
investment firms, insurance companies and pension funds. 
 
The market regulation extends to directives regulating securities market, public offering of securities, 
takeovers, investment funds and sometimes also relations between banks and insurance companies. Apart from 
stock exchange and other trading facilities to the market regulation belong also some post trading activities 
such as are clearing and settlement.5 
 
The European legal sources on financial market regulation regulate markets in financial instruments (Directive 
2004/39/EC), public offering of securities related prospectus (Directive 2003/71/EC), takeover bids (Directive 
                                                                          
5 Council Directive 85/611/EEC. 
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2004/25/EC), collective investment in securities (Directive 85/6111/EEC) , on insider dealing and market 
abuse (Directive 2003/(6/EC) , notification of managers , suspicious transactions, inside information in relation 
to derivatives (Directive 2004/72/EC). 
 
 
 Financial regulation institutions 
 
 Law underpins stable financial markets and is an important source of their vitality6. The new economic and 
political dynamics that shape the modern business environment underline the importance of international 
cooperative efforts and the role of international and regional financial institutions and regulatory bodies7. Their 
highly valuable goal is to promote proper financial and commercial laws, which can effectively be 
implemented by national legal institutions, provided by adequate resources and be granted the necessary 
authority to enforce the law. In pursuing that goal European directives are transferred to national legislation 
with comprehensive implementing transposition regulations. Due to that sometimes differences still exist in 
national legislations more due to transposition than national legislation. 
 
It has to be also pointed out that financial market regulations in Europe are relatively new. Even in Germany 
the most prosperous market economy regulator till 2000 the takeovers and securities have been regulated by 
stock exchange codes and not law. 
 
 The main task is to structure such a system of financial intermediaries and markets that’s adequate to the 
nature and requirements of the nation’s real economy and are well promoted and accepted in business 
community. Additionally, financial and commercial systems should be highly integrated and transparent. The 
most significant component of financial law nowadays involves an interdisciplinary and international concept 
of regulatory and market forces interconnection. The legal foundations of sound finance require a set of clear 





The European supervision of financial market is based on two concepts: committee organizational structure 
and coordination of national supervision bodies.8 
 
The project of supervising committees has been elaborated and promoted in the Lamfalussy report (Final 
Report of the Committee of wise men on the regulation of European securities market, 2001). The elaborate 
proposal consists of schemes of a four level phasing out of establishment of committees which have been set up 
by Commission decisions as: 
1. European Banking Committee (Decision 2004/10/EC);  
2. European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (Decision 2004/9/EC);  
3. European Securities Committee (Decision2004/8/EC). 
 
Level 3 are supervisory committees which are the: 
1. Committee of European Banking Supervisors ( Decision 2004/5/EC), 
2. Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Supervisors ( Decision 2004/6/EC), 
3. Committee of European Securities Regulators (Decision 20’04/3/32). 
 
The committee approach conflicts the functional expectations of European institutions. 
 
                                                                          
6 Sanders, G.: The legal anchoring of sound financial markets - Law in Transition; EBDR 1999; 
www.ebrd.com/country/sector/law/corpgov/about/anchor.pdf, accessed 11 March 2007 
7 Norton, J. J., Sir Lubbock, J.: International financial law and international economic law: implications for emerging and 
transition economies, Law in Transition; EBDR 1999, www.ebrd.com/country/sector/law/corpgov/about/anchor.pdf, accessed 11 
March 2007 
8 Decision 1999/468/EC, see: europa.eu.int/comm./intetrnal_market/finances/cross-sector/index_en.htm#committee 
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Since financial supervision has basically remained on the national level of 27 members states the need for 
coordination and cooperation on this level works as a substitute for a central European supervisory body, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Engle, 2006). 
 
 Before that is accomplished there are different modalities of cooperation described as de facto cooperation, 
memoranda of understanding, the European scheme based on recognition of supervisory competence of the 
home supervisor, delegation, appointment of coordinator designation of lead supervisor (Chiu H-Y, 2006). 
 
 
5. SOME FEATURES OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES DIRECTIVES 
 
Efforts to regulate the securities sector on a supranational level origin from the first Company law Directive of 
19689, real support for market participants was obtained by the promulgation of the 1999 Financial Services 
Action Plan. European securities regulation has emerged as a new and quickly developing field within the legal 
basis of the European financial markets. The goals of the EU Securities law are found in the Directives and 
other regulations and decisions.10 At the same time the implementation and enforcement of securities law is 
found in the national laws of the Member states. The policy goals of EC Securities Law are to protect investors, 
assure proper functioning of securities market, and attain uniform standards within the community. The scope 
of the regulations is to support investor confidence in the stability of the market.  
 
The Listing Admission Directive is one of the effective instruments in achieving these goals11. It determines 
conditions for listing securities issued by one Member state, on the stock exchanges of other Member states. It 
protects investors by assuring adequate capitalization of companies and building a single capital market by 
integrating securities law. The Listing Admission Directive requires companies to report material information 
which may affect the price of these financial instruments, such as balance statements that need to be disclosed 
and published, thus allowing dissemination. The conditions under which the securities issued by a company 
based in one Member state will be admitted to the stock market and stock markets of other Member states are 
governed by the New Prospectus Directives. The first objective of the Directive is to create a system of mutual 
recognition to reduce transaction costs associated with listing shares on other stock markets in the EU in order 
to obtain an integrated capital market. The second objective of the Direction is protection of investors via 
disclosure rules that promote capital formation and allocation. The abovementioned regulations support the 
integration of the capital market and sustain global competition of European securities. 
 
 
6. REGULATING INSIDER TRADING 
 
The strongest and clearest impact of the Communities acquis on the Member states law is visible through the 
Insider Trading Directive12. At Member State level, the rules varied greatly and legal requirements differed 
                                                                          
9 First Council Directive of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members 
and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, 
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community (68/151/EEC) 
10 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field; Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 
20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities (UCITS); Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC 
11 Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2001 on the admission of securities to official 
stock exchange listing and on information to be published on those securities; Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to 
trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (Text with EEA relevance); Commission Regulation (CE) 809/2004 of 29 April 
2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in 
prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of 
advertisements 
12 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse); Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices, the definition of inside information in relation to 
derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification of managers' transactions and the notification of 
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according to jurisdiction prior to this Directive, which resulted in distorted financial markets’ competition due 
to an incomplete legal framework in market integrity. As the community identified two main aspects of market 
abuse – insider dealing and market manipulation, it put forward two separate Directives addressing each 
category. The first regulation that prohibited insider trading and related actions was the 1989 Insider Dealing 
Directive13. The Directive presented a standard raising awareness that the prohibition and sanction of these 
categories of unlawful acts should be regulated in a common, if not in a uniform manner, throughout the 
Community. According to the Directive each Member State has to designate a single regulatory and 
supervisory authority with a common minimum set of responsibilities. These authorities should combat market 
abuse and be able to assist each other in taking action against infringements, particularly in cross-border cases. 
The same form of unlawful acts shall incur the same penalty in each Member State, although the Treaty does 
not provide for complete harmonization of penalties. Nevertheless, it is certain that the new disciplinary 
framework will contribute to the convergence between national systems and ensure better compliance with the 
requirements of the Directive14. 
 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The harmonization of financial and securities market law in EU has gone beyond the approximation of law, 
considering the very modest and late codifications in European countries in this field (Germany has enacted 
securities and takeover law in 2000). As a consequence the EU financial market directives are introducing new 
rather than harmonization existing law and practice. 
 
The methodology applied is typically European, institutional more than functional, complicated, costly, based 
on long term effects. On this point they would not pass the test of transparency and convergence to real sector 
in 27 of member states. 
 
In spite of that some authors have doubts that this financial integration can follow and control the important 
innovations which took place outside of regulated markets.15 Examples are: Eurobonds, derivatives, hedge 
funds, structured finance. American authors join this concern pointing out that markets can not control 
themselves and that complex hedging instruments like default swaps and collateralized debt obligations are 
multiplying faster than anyone’s liability to track them (Gaarten, 2007). 
 
 The question is if it is necessary to police and anticipate all the models and innovative practice of financial 
markets strictly, or that some general frame of principles for that purpose should be established. The analogy 
could be drawn with legal frame and methodology of commercial contracts which has so far enabled the wide 
expansion of autonomous (sui generis) contracts and legal control fulfillment of basic principles and minimal 
formal requirements. The sophisticated comitology structure and regulators should have open minds, and doors 
of their boards, to fulfill their tasks within turbulent and mighty financial markets and stakeholders in Europe 
and related global market. 
 
Since financial markets regulations and harmonization is in initial stage it is obviously that the process has to 
continue, that complex regulations have yet to be accepted by business community and courts. In addition 
states have to decide on their policy and real sector effects of the enforcement process even if it can create 
delusions and opposition from stakeholders. Hope remains that regulation and regulators will fulfill their tasks 
even on a slow pace rather than being hurried into doing that by a major financial national or European wide 
debacle. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
suspicious transactions [Official Journal L 162, 30.04.2004]; Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 
implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of 
inside information and the definition of market manipulation [Official Journal L 339, 24.12.2003] 
13 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing 
14 For further information see : http: //europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24035.htm  
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Academics and research can and must serve as indispensable intermediate between all these stakeholders 
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